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Migration has brought about, and continues to be responsible for, some of 
the most momentous social, economic, and political changes in the 
contemporary world. Over the years, millions of people have moved from 
their rural homes in search of better paid work, usually in cities many 
thousands of miles away. Their movement has precipitated many dramatic 
changes, no less in the societies they left than in the ones they joined. It 
has also produced many new structures of inequality and exploitation. This 
paper explores the character of these developments in the case of one 
particular body of migrants - peasant farmers from northern Pakistan who 
have migrated to Britain and the Middle East during the past three decades. 
 
The structural context of migration 
International migration is primarily a consequence of global inequalities in 
the distribution of wealth and power. Sometimes, as in the case of 
European colonial expansion, the powerful have moved to settle amongst 
the relatively powerless; but in recent years an even larger number of 
people have left their rural homes and have gone to live in the metropolitan 
heartlands - in an effort to exploit, as far as they could, the wage earning 
opportunities available there. The timing and volume of such movements 
has been determined primarily by the strength of the demand for industrial 
labour; and despite periodic slumps, the trend of that demand, at least until 
very recently, was firmly upwards. But following the introduction of 
micro-chip technology in the 1980s, the presence of a large manual labour 
force has ceased to be a prerequisite of industrial production: indeed 
investment in new technology now tends to reduce the demand for labour. 
Future industrial expansion is unlikely to necessitate either the recruitment 
or the importation of a large new workforce. In consequence we may well 
have seen the last of the migratory flows  
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which have hitherto invariably accompanied industrialization; but even so, 
the effects of the movements which have already taken place will long be 
with us. 
Migrant workers are always socially, economically, and politically 
vulnerable. As well as being particularly exposed to the impact of booms 
and slumps in the international labour market, they themselves embody 
many contradictions. Doing better, by definition, than they would have 
done had they stayed at home, they are nevertheless disadvantaged in 
comparison with members of the indigenous population among whom they 
live and work, and with whom they are, as newcomers, in unequal 
competition for jobs and other scarce resources. Should they, or more 
likely their children, manage to make a secure base for themselves in their 
new home - a prospect of which the natives are often fearful - then they 
will, at least on a personal basis, have overcome the worst of the 
inequalities that led to their migration in the first place; but as long as they 
remain identifiable, they will always be in danger. In times of adversity, 
outsiders make ideal scapegoats. So it is that some of the most explosive 
popular movements in the contemporary world are directed against 
minorities which can be identified as `immigrant' - witness recent events in 
West Africa, Indonesia, Assam, Sri Lanka, and now throughout Western 
Europe and North America. And such hostility is usually not just directed 
at immigrants themselves, but also at their locally-born offspring. In 
contemporary Britain, `immigrants' are people of non-European physical 
appearance, wherever they may have been born. 
Conflicts between `immigrants' and `natives' are nothing new,-of course: 
they are at least as old as industrialization itself. As Marx observed, 
writing to friends in 1870: 
 
Every industrial and commercial centre in England now possesses a 
working class divided into two hostile camps, English proletarians and 
Irish proletarians. The ordinary English worker hates the Irish worker as 
a competitor who lowers his own standard of life ... and the Irish worker 
pays him back with interest in his own money ... This antagonism is the 
secret of the impotence of the English working class, despite their 
organization. (Marx 1953: 504) 
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Despite the power of Marx's empirical observations, most Marxist theorists 
have, of course, since argued that class both would, and should, be the 
primary social contradiction in all industrialized societies. Nevertheless it 
is now clear that ethnic conflicts - which usually have their roots in 
migration - are to be found almost everywhere, and that in many societies 
they completely override class conflicts. Thus while class may always have 
been a crucial component of inequality in British society, an ethnic factor 
has long been present too. The English/Irish divide which was so 
prominent in the last century may now have become less salient, except in 
Ulster, but only because it has simply been replaced by parallel tensions 
surrounding new groups of immigrants - Jews, Eastern Europeans, and 
most recently South Asians and AfroCaribbeans. 
Such conflicts have many dimensions, but the driving force behind 
racial and ethnic polarization is invariably to be found in competition for 
scarce resources. Hence tensions between `natives' and `immigrants' are 
invariably most acute during periods of recession; and they are most easily 
sustained where the newcomers are easily identifiable. It is small wonder 
that race relations have become such an explosive political issue, not just 
in Britain, but also in Germany and France, where the Turkish and North 
African presence is proportionately even larger than that of Asians and 
Afro-Caribbeans in Britain (Castles, Booth, and Wallace 1984). Not only 
are such migrants and their offspring readily identifiable by virtue of their 
physical appearance, but with the sudden collapse of the post-war boom, 
the labour market in industrial Europe has changed dramatically. As a 
result of the introduction of new technology, the loss of overseas imperial 
markets, and the success of newly industrialized countries of the Far East, 
the labour shortage of the past two decades has been replaced by a huge 
surplus. Millions of industrial workers have been made redundant, and the 
chances of their ever finding employment again are now remote. In such 
circumstances the growth of popular hostility towards an identifiable group 
of `immigrant' scapegoats was only to be expected. 
But it is important to keep a clear perspective on exactly what is 
going on here. Precisely because they are in a majority, it is the indigenous 
majority who have lost most jobs numerically. Hence there is much support 
for the view that if only the number of `immigrants' could be reduced, there 
would be more jobs left to go round for everyone else. But given the 
kinds of jobs to which the newcomers had access - unskilled tasks in the 
older and undercapitalized industries such as textiles and heavy 
engineering – it 
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is they who have been far more vulnerable than anyone else to the impact 
of the recession. In many communities in the Midlands and Yorkshire 
more than half the men have lost their jobs in the past five years. And 
given the existence of routine racial discrimination, their chances of 
finding alternative employment are far less than those of their white 
compatriots. 
Migration, citizenship, and rights of residence 
Even so, migrant workers in Western Europe are more secure than many. 
Despite increasing popular support for right-wing movements which 
advocate their repatriation, most migrants have by now acquired 
permanent rights of residence; in Britain those from the Commonwealth 
have gone one step further and become full British citizens. This stands 
in sharp contrast to the position of migrant workers in many other parts of 
the world, most particularly in the Middle East. There the total volume of 
migration has been on a scale akin to that to Western Europe (Birks and 
Sinclair 1980), but almost everyone has been employed on short-term 
contracts. Such migrants are liable to repatriation as soon as they lose 
their jobs; the question of permanent rights of residence, let alone of 
citizenship, has never even arisen. But the Middle Eastern bonanza did 
not last long. With the collapse in the price of oil, and the completion or 
cancellation of most of the construction projects on which they were 
employed, migrants to the Middle East have not only been made 
redundant; they are being forced, willy-nilly, to return home. 
Although the new minorities in Europe may have legal rights which 
should protect them from straightforward repatriation of this kind, their 
situation is still far from secure. Given the extent of current 
unemployment, many indigenous Europeans feel that the new minorities 
should never have been given rights of residence in the first place, and 
these doubts are further reinforced by negative judgements of the 
minorities' behavioural strategies. Now that it is clear that newcomers and 
their offspring have not, for the most part, assimilated, but are instead 
sustaining their own distinctive lifestyles, especially in domestic 
contexts, it is widely asserted that the (supposed) cultural unity of the 
nation is somehow endangered. Hence the popular feeling that the 
minorities' chosen lifestyles are incompatible with their claims to 
citizenship; on these grounds it is often argued that repatriation should be 
encouraged, whatever the minorities' formal legal rights may be. Of 
course, members of the new minorities counter this by 
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insisting just as vigorously that they are `here to stay', and on their own 
terms, whatever the majority may say. The issues here are essentially 
political, rather than moral or legal (Sivanandan 1983). And as dominant 
groups everywhere gradually discover, minority interests cannot be 
gratuitously ignored, for their angry reaction is likely to endanger the 
fabric of the whole social polity. 
Migration and ethnicity 
Although public arguments about the legitimacy of the minorities' survival 
strategies, and so about the cultural correlates of citizenship, are becoming 
increasingly bitter, the tendency for minorities to organize ethnically is 
neither novel nor unique. Migrants everywhere, including Europeans 
overseas, as well as earlier Jewish and Irish settlers in Britain, have always 
closed ranks in defence of their collective interests. It is on this basis that 
the new non-European settlers have established thriving ethnic colonies in 
the inner areas of all the European industrial cities in which they have 
settled. 
The reasons why are not hard to identify. The varied sets of skills, 
assumptions, and understandings that migrants brought with them are the 
cultural capital out of which they and their children have generated new, 
and for the most part highly effective, strategies of survival as a means of 
coping with an alien and largely hostile environment. These strategies may 
have their roots overseas, but they are essentially a response to their users' 
Local experience. So however alien the lifestyles of the new minorities 
may seem to the indigenous majority, they are nevertheless an intrinsically 
British phenomenon. And if that is not the way in which they are 
commonly understood, then that is precisely the problem. Not until the 
lifestyles of locally resident Hindus, Moslems, Sikhs, and Rastas are seen 
as no less British than those of the Scots, the Irish, the Welsh, and indeed 
the English themselves, will a significant improvement in majority-
minority relations have occurred, and the bogey of repatriation finally be 
laid. 
Yet however politically and analytically vital it may be to insist that 
the new minorities are an integral part of the societies in   which they 
have settled, it does not necessarily follow that their ties with the societies 
into which they or their parents were born will have ceased to be 
significant. Many links remain. Kinship obligations, often sustained by 
marriages between overseas settlers and those who stayed back home, still 
bind everyone together into 
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a single network. And these ties are enhanced by those of sentiment. 
Migrants (and their children) invariably cherish memories of their 
historical roots for reasons of psychological security; and the experience of 
exclusion invariably reinforces that tendency. 
Emigrants and their societies of origin 
Although migrants invariably seek to preserve a rosy view of life and 
conditions back home, their status there is usually no less complex and 
contradictory than in their countries of settlement. Richer, by definition, 
than those they left behind, emigrants are still expected to fulfil their 
kinship obligations by extending material support to their families, 
especially to the very old, the very young, and the destitute. Even those 
who are most securely settled overseas invariably continue to remit a 
portion of their' earnings back home, and most stay much more involved 
than this, making regular visits back home. Few fail to buy more land, 
should it become available, and most important, of all, to build themselves 
an elaborate new house. This partly reflects a concern for honour and 
status, and the wish to demonstrate how much success they have achieved 
overseas; but it also reflects a desire to build up security against the day 
when they finally return home. 
Not only do most migrants come to rely on their home contacts, but 
those back home also come to rely on them, especially when migration 
takes place on a large scale. Recipient households tend to become 
increasingly dependent on the regular arrival of remittances for their 
continued financial health, as may the local and even the national 
economy. As ever, dependency is dangerous. Should the flow of 
remittances decline, either because migrants' priorities have changed, or 
because changes in the global economy have diminished or eliminated their 
sources of income, those who have grown used to a regular financial `fix' 
can find themselves in desperate straits. It is easy to become addicted to 
remittance income, because it comes at so little cost. Indeed it is often in 
the interests of those who have stayed behind to encourage migrants to stay 
overseas for as long as possible, provided that they can be sure that they 
will continue to send back remittances: that way they can continue to reap 
the benefits of migrants' labours elsewhere. Migrants are easily exploitable, 
and not just by other members of their families. Those who control the 
national economy can have a similar interest in the foreign exchange 
component of their remittances. For them a naked policy 
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of `manpower export' may make a great deal of sense in the short term, 
even it, as we shall see, the consequent condition of dependency may court 
long-term disaster. 
In sum, migrants often find themselves socially, politically, and 
economically vulnerable, no less in the society that they have left than in 
the one they have joined. 
Patterns of emigration from Pakistan 
All these contradictions are clearly illustrated in the case of emigration 
from Pakistan, where over two million people - approximately 10 per cent 
of the country's adult male labour force - currently work overseas. Of these 
the great majority are employed in the oil-rich states of the Middle East, 
especially in Saudi Arabia; but a further 300,000 live and work in Britain. 
The remittances that they send home have now become a critical 
component of the national economy: they make up over 50 per cent of 
Pakistan's foreign exchange income. But with a major recession in Britain 
and even sharper cutbacks throughout the Arab world, this inflow is 
shrinking sharply, causing acute problems for the Pakistani economy. 
Before examining what these might be, we must begin by exploring how it 
is that so many Pakistanis came to seek their fortunes overseas, what 
happened to them when they got there, and the changes that have since 
been precipitated in their villages of origin. 
The great majority of emigrants from Pakistan are of rural origin, and 
come from villages lying in the unirrigated, wheat growing barani areas in 
the north of the country (Gilani, Khan, and Iqbal 1979). Though less 
prosperous than the irrigated canal colonies further to the south, this area 
has always been densely populated. Because of the small size of 
agricultural holdings, and the conventional division of labour between the 
sexes, many households have long had a surplus of male labour. There is a 
longstanding local tradition for men from such households to supplement 
their incomes by working elsewhere. 
Soon after the Punjab was incorporated into the British Raj in 1849, 
local men began to sign up as soldiers, especially after Punjabis were 
classified as a particularly `loyal' and `martial' race following the mutiny of 
the Bengal Army in 1857. To this day, the majority of soldiers in the 
Pakistani Army come from this area. But men in more localized areas also 
began to explore other new opportunities. For our purposes, one of the 
most significant developments came at around the turn of the century, 
when men 
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from a scatter of villages just inside the Maharaja of Kashmir's territories 
began to take work as stokers on merchant ships operating out of Bombay. 
Just how it was that villagers living so far from the sea pioneered this niche 
I have not yet been able to discover, but it was ex-seamen who were the 
principal pioneers of the contemporary Pakistani settlement in Britain. 
As a result at least three quarters of British Pakistanis can trace their 
origins to an area no more than 20 miles by 30, lying mostly in what is now 
Azad Kashmir, and particularly focused on Mirpur District. In many 
Mirpuri villages, especially those lying close to those from which seamen 
were recruited, half or more of the population now lives in Britain. 
Migration to Britain 
When the earliest Mirpuri settlers came ashore during the 1930s, industrial 
jobs were virtually impossible to obtain, so most followed the longstanding 
tradition (see Salter 1873) of making a living as itinerant pedlars. During 
the Second World War the number of settlers grew rapidly. Britain's heavy 
industries were acutely short of labour, so that not only did many former 
pedlars switch to industrial jobs, but Mirpuri seamen who had had their 
ships torpedoed beneath them soon found themselves drafted off to work in 
munitions factories in Yorkshire and the West Midlands (see Dahya 1974: 
84). Once transport was available after the close of hostilities some went 
home with their accumulated savings, but most stayed on to take advantage 
of the opportunities that became available in the post-war industrial boom. 
The jobs open to migrants were of a restricted kind - essentially those 
which the indigenous population were unwilling to undertake, because they 
were hot, hard, heavy, or low paid. But to Kashmiri peasant farmers they 
offered the prospect of unparalleled prosperity, especially since their 
traditional jobs as stokers were disappearing rapidly as coal-fired ships 
were phased out after the war. 
In the late 1940s and early 1950s an increasing number of seamen left 
their ships to take industrial jobs on shore, and soon afterwards began 
actively to call kinsmen and fellow villagers over to join them; it was thus 
that a process of chain migration began (Khan 1977; Anwar 1979). Until 
1962, Commonwealth citizens had an unrestricted right of entry into 
Britain, and the steady inflow of settlers was essentially a response to the 
almost continual growth in demand for unskilled industrial labour. But in 
response to popular protests from the indigenous majority, a whole 
series of measures to control the influx of (non-European) immigrants 
have since been taken. The first of these, the 1962 Immigration Act, 
largely failed in its purpose. 
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Contrary to popular belief, migrants were coming neither to join the 
dole queue, nor to steal white jobs. The mills and foundries in which 
they worked were acutely short of labour and employers were only too 
happy to issue the vouchers which the Act introduced, for that was the 
only way they could keep production going. Prospective migrants 
knew that once they had obtained their vouchers from kinsmen in 
England they were guaranteed entry when they arrived at Heathrow. 
Far from controlling immigration, the voucher system tended to speed 
it up - so in the early 1960s virtually every able-bodied man who was 
not otherwise engaged and who lived in the area surrounding the 
seamen's villages set off for Britain. 
Since 1965, when the issue of vouchers was halted, it has been 
made progressively more difficult for adult males of non-European 
origin to enter Britain, even though industrial jobs remained plentiful. 
These are precisely the conditions in which illegal immigration is to 
be expected. An unknown number of Pakistanis did enter Britain in 
this way while jobs were still available, but since the onset of the 
current recession, this surreptitious inflow has virtually ceased. 
Nevertheless the total inflow of people arriving from Pakistan to settle 
in Britain has hardly declined at all over the years: it has simply 
changed in character. 
During the first phase of migration it was men alone who came. 
Wives and children were left at home with their families, to whom 
periodic visits were made after intervals of anything between two and 
five years. At that stage hardly anyone envisaged that their stay in 
Britain might be permanent: like their predecessors who had worked as 
soldiers and seamen, they expected eventually to return home to live in 
comfortable retirement on their accumulated savings. Some have done 
just that, but many more have ended up staying in Britain for much 
longer than they intended, particularly those who have been joined by 
the remainder of their family. 
Paradoxically, it was legislation designed to control immigration 
that played a major role in persuading Pakistani settlers to reunite 
their families overseas. Once the issue of vouchers ceased, the easiest 
way to augment the family's wage-earning capacity was to bring over 
dependent children shortly before they reached the age of sixteen: then 
they could start work as soon as they had passed school leaving age. 
But as soon as the immigration authorities realized that this was 
happening on a substantial scale, they 
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changed the rules, and began to insist that the whole family - wives and 
daughters as well as sons - should be reunited at one and the same time. 
Even so, it was easy enough, although somewhat expensive, to circumvent 
this restriction. Wives and daughters could be brought over for a few 
months' visit, and then sent back home again. But the mould had been 
broken. With the growing complexity and stability of their ethnic colonies, 
settlers began to grow increasingly confident that they could reunite their 
families in their new surroundings without compromising their honour. 
Consequently the number of Pakistani women settled in Britain has risen 
rapidly from a very low base since 1970, and there is hardly anyone who 
has not applied for permission for his family to join him. 
Almost all Pakistani settlers have obtained British citizenship, so they 
now have an unchallengeable legal right to reunite their families in Britain. 
But exercising that right is by no means straightforward. Given ever more 
insistent demands from the white majority that immigration should be 
reduced to the lowest possible level, all applications made to the British 
Embassy in Islamabad are now subjected to severe scrutiny (Commission 
for Racial Equality 1985). Entry certificate officers have to be convinced 
that all members of the family are related to the applicant as claimed; but 
they frequently manage to convince themselves that this is not so. The 
application is then rejected. Not only does this lead to severe hardship for 
all those concerned, but it also means that yet another family has been 
added to the merry-go-round. The settler in Britain has no alternative but to 
keep up his visits, and either to re-submit his application, or to look for 
British-based spouses for his children if the immigration authorities are 
otherwise excluding them. 
As a result of processes of this kind, the pressure of work in the 
immigration section of the Embassy has been growing year by year. So far 
the majority of applications have been for family reunions, and it has been 
assumed that the volume of work would be finite - that once all the 
applications in the pipeline have been processed, immigration would cease. 
But it is now becoming apparent that this is not so. In addition to the 
backlog of family reunion cases, there are now a rapidly rising number of 
applications from young people who have grown up in Britain but who 
have married in Pakistan, and also from families who have lived in Britain, 
but who have subsequently returned to Pakistan, and now wish to return to 
Britain once again. Immigration to Britain, or rather a complex pattern of 
movement back and forth between Britain and Pakistan, is set to be an on-
going process. 
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The reasons why are worth exploring in some detail. 
Marriage rules and their implications 
When members of a community within which marriages are customarily 
arranged migrate, it is only to be expected that in the initial stages of 
settlement, parents will continue to fix the same marriages as they would 
have done had they not migrated. But as the overseas colony consolidates 
itself, it would seem to follow that they will gradually begin to seek 
partners for their offspring from within their immediate community, so 
reducing the frequency of matches back home. This has happened quite 
swiftly in the case of Hindu and Sikh migrants to Britain; but because of 
the differing impact of their marriage rules, Moslem Pakistanis are 
behaving quite differently. Not only have they delayed reuniting their 
families, but the frequency of overseas marriages remains much higher. 
While the rules of clan exogamy practised by Hindus and Sikhs lead to 
virtually all marriages taking place between non-relatives, among Moslems 
the situation is wholly reversed. The marriage of cousins (both cross and 
parallel) is not only permitted, but it is preferred: siblings have the right of 
first refusal with respect to the marriages of each other's children. Thus 
while Sikh and Hindu migrants have no prior obligations with respect to 
their children's marriages, and can place them where they choose, Moslem 
migrants are members of much more closely-knit kinship networks, within 
which they usually find themselves under intense pressure to accept offers 
of marriage on behalf of their siblings' children back in Pakistan. And they 
also know that if they refuse, they are likely to be charged with having 
become so anglicized that they have forgotten their most fundamental 
duties towards their kin. These pressures are extremely hard to resist. So as 
more and more migrants' children reach marriageable age, the frequency of 
marriage with partners back in Pakistan is rising rapidly. 
Residence after marriage was traditionally patri-virilocal, so there is 
rarely much question but that the Pakistani brides in such matches will 
come to Britain. But given the poor local employment prospects, the 
incentive for grooms to do the same' is large; indeed it is now assumed by 
all concerned that they will almost certainly want to do so. Hence 
marriages of British-born girls with Pakistani grooms are effectively a 
means of avoiding the exclusionary effect of immigration legislation - as 
those who 
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frame the rules are well aware. All sorts of administrative hurdles have 
been introduced to make it as difficult as possible for such couples to 
exercise their right to enter Britain. Just who will be most successful in the 
midst of all this remains to be seen. But given the logic of their kinship 
system, the strength of family loyalties, and the large differentials in living 
standards between Britain and Pakistan, the number of young couples 
seeking to enter Britain seems likely to continue to increase, however 
hostile the law may become. 
Return migration from Britain to Pakistan 
At first few, if any, Pakistani migrants to Britain envisaged that their 
residence overseas would be anything but temporary. However long they 
might have worked in Britain, they expected that they would eventually go 
home to enjoy the fruits of their labour - and now that an increasing 
number of settlers are reaching retirement age, some are doing just that. A 
British pension goes a long way in rural Pakistan. But in addition to these 
pensioners, a further category of returnee has recently become salient - 
those who have been pushed that way by redundancy and recession in 
Britain. Until 1979, few settlers were ever unemployed for long. 
Alternative, if low paid, employment was invariably available: even if it 
was located in a distant city, migrants would seek out kinsmen who lived 
nearby and go and stay temporarily with them; they were nothing if not 
flexible. But with the onset of the current recession almost all these 
alternatives dried up. Since 1979, there has been no work anywhere. 
At first those who had lost their jobs sat it out, hoping that conditions 
would change. But with no sign whatsoever of an upturn in the demand for 
industrial labour, an increasing number of middle-aged men have been 
giving serious consideration to going back and trying their luck in 
Pakistan. From their perspective it seems to make good sense. All have 
land and a house there, and very often some other property as well; that is - 
where the remainder of their biraderi or kin group lives, and often where 
their hearts still lie, despite years of residence overseas. And by selling 
their house in Britain, returnees can raise the capital to finance the 
immediate costs of resettlement. As they, grow increasingly disillusioned 
with life on the dole, so more and more men are setting off back to 
Pakistan, taking their whole family with them. 
Sadly, their experience is rarely happy. Not only is the cost of 
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living a great deal higher than they expected, but opportunities to make 
money are few and far between. Most returnees go back hoping to start a 
business of one kind or another, but soon discover that doing so 
successfully in rural Pakistan is far from easy. Credit is difficult to raise, 
personal contacts are essential, and competition within the market place 
(often from other returnees) is fierce. Profits, let alone a decent income, are 
hard to make. And although many feel that their land should provide an 
ultimate backstop, their holdings are generally so small, and productivity is 
so low, that it rarely provides much beyond the family's basic subsistence 
needs. In these circumstances, most middle-aged returnees find that their 
savings gradually but inexorably drain away. After a while almost all reach 
the conclusion that they have no alternative but to take their whole family 
back to Britain again, in order to take advantage of the strictly limited 
luxuries of the supplementary benefit system. 
Social networks in the diaspora 
in view of the elaborate set of contacts still being maintained between 
settlers in Britain and their kinsmen back home, as well as the constant 
physical movement of people back and forth between the two arenas, it is 
now very clear that it is quite wrong to regard Pakistani migration to 
Britain as a single time-limited event. Instead it is much better understood 
as a process whereby a body of people have established a permanent 
overseas bridgehead, and where, having done so, there is a constant 
interchange of people and resources between the two ends of the migratory 
chain. The driving forces behind this process are first kinship, reinforced in 
this case by close kin marriage, such that all networks are extremely close 
knit and inturned; second the growing differential in material wealth 
between the two arenas, which makes those left back in Pakistan ever more 
concerned to sustain their relationships with kin in Britain; third the 
uneasiness of Pakistani settlers in Britain, especially in the face of 
recession and rapidly growing racism, which makes them view their 
homeland as the safest possible haven in times of trouble; and finally 
Britain's immigration law, which, despite fundamental injustices in its 
content and applications, still offers at least a chance for those with kin in 
Britain to climb out of the Third World and into the First. So despite the 
introduction of ever more draconian immigration legislation, large numbers 
of people seem likely to continue moving back and forth between Britain 
and Pakistan for the foreseeable future.  
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Migration and the Middle Eastern labour market 
Britain is not, however, the principal overseas destination of Pakistani 
migrants. Following the sharp rise in the price of oil in the early 1970s, all 
the oil-rich states of the Middle East embarked on massive programmes of 
infrastructural development, which in turn generated a huge demand for 
labour. For the most part the indigenous populations of these newly rich 
states were small, and lacked technical and craft skills; and given access to 
what seemed at first to be an inexhaustible supply of wealth, it appeared 
unnecessary for the local population to take work seriously. Replacement 
manpower could be imported instead. So it was that a huge expatriate 
labour force was drawn into these underpopulated but suddenly capital rich 
countries. 
Recruited world wide, the migrant workers were clearly stratified in 
racial terms. Those recruited for the better paid skilled and professional 
tasks were predominantly of European origin, while manual workers were 
recruited initially from Egypt and Palestine, later from the Indian sub-
continent, and most recently from a wide range of countries in South-East 
Asia (Birks and Sinclair 1980). 
But in little more than a decade, the Middle Eastern labour market has 
changed with unparalleled swiftness. At first conditions were relatively 
good. The employers were for the most part major multinational 
construction companies, and even manual workers were paid at European 
and North American rates. So the Middle East was an attractive prospect 
for everyone who could find their way there. But this did not last long. By 
the early 1980s the heady days were over, and even the Saudis began to 
seek value for money. Contractors were heavily squeezed, and they began 
to economize, particularly on their wages bills. Rates of pay dropped 
sharply. Today, in the mid-1980s, the situation is even more critical. With 
the real price of oil back to the level at which it stood in the early 1970s, 
most oil states have large budget deficits. Many construction projects are 
being abandoned, and none are being started. The demand for labour is 
plummeting. Competition for jobs is intense, and wages have fallen to 
unprecendentedly low levels. Large numbers of people, especially from 
countries such as Pakistan where migrants have come to expect a relatively 
high level of wages, are being sent back home. Their sudden swift return is 
having a major impact on their countries of origin. 
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Emigration from Pakistan to the Middle East 
Contacts between the Middle East and what is now Pakistan are of long 
standing. The earliest trading links between the Indus delta and 
Mesopotamia were established at least 4,000 years ago, and to this day 
many of the leading trading houses in the Gulf are run by families of sub-
continental origin. Similarly there have long been links between the 
Makran coast and Oman, where a majority of the Sultan's troops are 
Baluchis. These ties, supplemented by others established by ex-soldiers 
from the British Indian Army who stayed on in the Middle East after 
various campaigns, formed the basis of a flow by chain migration into the 
jobs made available by the gradual expansion of the oil industry in the 
immediate post-war years. But when the boom took off in the early 1970s, 
these channels were unable to supply a sufficiently large volume of labour, 
so recruitment on a more formal basis began. Agents, many of whom were 
of Pakistani origin, made agreements with construction companies to 
supply a certain number of men with specified skills, and then secured their 
homeland for suitable recruits. They soon found that the people from the 
barani areas were the most responsive, partly because they had a long 
tradition of working away from home, but also because they had sufficient 
resources to pay the high fees that agents were soon able to demand before 
allocating them a visa. By the early 1980s, as much as Rs20,000 (£1,000) 
was being demanded from those seeking no more than a labourer's job. 
People from the very poorest families, and from the most remote villages 
which lacked access to any outside resources, simply could not afford to 
go. Most migrants were recruited from a broad swathe of districts running 
right across Northern Pakistan, and whose environmental character is very 
similar to that of Mirpur. So although migration to the Middle East may 
have been larger in volume than that to Britain, it was not so densely 
concentrated: hardly a village in the whole barani area has been left 
unaffected by the exodus. 
Migration and the local economy in Mirpur 
It is not so much the migrants' absence, but their remittances which have 
the largest impact on the local social order. Over the years, Pakistanis in 
Britain have sent home many millions of pounds, the arrival of which has 
had a radical effect on the Mirpuri economy. In principle this large inflow 
of capital resources might have been expected to precipitate rapid 
economic 
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development in an otherwise underdeveloped area, but in practice things 
have turned out otherwise: the local economy is actually stagnating. We 
must explore why that should be so. 
During the 1950s, 1960s, and early 1970s, before they had brought their 
families to Britain, migrants remitted the greater part of their savings 
straight back to Pakistan (Dahya 1974: 113). Having paid the cost of their 
passage and met the subsistence needs of the remainder of their family, 
their next target was usually to build themselves a splendid and prestigious 
new house. Consequently there was an immense building boom in Mirpur 
in the late 1960s and early 1970s. New houses were constructed 
everywhere, even in the most remote and inaccessible villages. Suddenly 
there was a huge demand for construction materials - bricks, steel, cement, 
timber, and so forth - and also for masons and carpenters to build the 
houses. This set off an unprecedented economic boom. Bazaars expanded 
rapidly, as entrepreneurs sprang forth to serve the new market; and so great 
was the demand for labour that local wages rose sharply, attracting 
immigrants from neighbouring areas from which overseas migration had 
not then taken place. But this boom was not to last for long. By the mid-
1970s most migrants to Britain had reconstructed their houses, and 
thereafter the volume of construction activity fell sharply. 
Nevertheless, those who were well placed in the market made a lot of 
money out of the housing boom, and this was to have some important 
effects for the future. Since they expected eventually to return home, all 
migrants were looking for a safe and profitable form of investment - 
preferably in some kind of bazaar-based business. Although mostly peasant 
farmers by origin, few, if any, considered investing in agriculture. Working 
on the land had long been considered unprestigious, and so a return to 
cultivation was considered a step backwards socially. This judgement was 
far from irrational. Given low agricultural prices, and the absence of 
significant infrastructural support from the state, farming has become less 
and less economically attractive in Mirpur, and indeed throughout the 
whole barani area, despite the great potential fertility of the soil. Since 
local wages and expectations have risen as a result of the inflow of 
remittances, agricultural activity has not been stimulated by migration: on 
the contrary it has been depressed. 
With such large numbers of people now living overseas, many 
households are now acutely short of labour; but as most also receive a 
supplementary remittance income, they no longer need to depend wholly 
on the land for their subsistence. As a result the 
 
The political economy of migration 33 
land in Mirpur is becoming increasingly ill farmed, and large areas are 
being withdrawn from cultivation altogether. Almost all the stonier fields 
on hillsides have long since been abandoned, and now a growing amount of 
the most fertile land never sees the plough: it is unlikely to do so again 
unless a rise in grain prices returns agriculture to profitability. So from 
having produced a substantial exportable food surplus in the past 
(Rawalpindi District Gazetteer 1894: 155), the area is now in chronic 
deficit. Of course Mirpuris now have plenty of money to buy imported 
grain, most of which is sold at subsidized prices through ration shops, so 
there is no shortage of food. Instead the whole economy is slipping 
inexorably into a condition of dependency. 
Since agriculture offers so little, business is invariably seen as the best 
and most secure way of making money. In consequence every village in the 
area now has an extensive bazaar. But although activity may have been 
brisk at the height of the construction boom fifteen years ago, this is no 
longer so. Many speculatively built shop units remain unlet, and even in 
those that are, activity is very sluggish. Most businesses are very small, 
and too many people are chasing too little trade. Competition is so fierce 
that margins must be cut to the bone. Hardly anyone makes much profit. At 
present the only people doing well are some travel agents, and a few large 
and well established wholesale merchants. Returnees who are hoping to 
make a living by starting a business have a hard row to hoe. No wonder 
few succeed. 
Local tensions are also building up as a result of economic stagnation, 
particularly since so few opportunities are now available for young men. 
With growing affluence, education has become affordable for Mirpuri 
peasants, and so for the first time large numbers of boys have been sent to 
school and college. As jobs overseas dried up, their families hoped that 
education would improve their sons' opportunities for employment. But 
they have met a dead end. The few local jobs as teachers and bank clerks 
have long since been filled, there is no local industry, and agriculture is 
rejected out of hand. Some young men are trying their hand at opening 
small shops in the bazaar, although this is often no more than a means of 
showing to relatives in Britain that they are at least trying to help 
themselves, and they are therefore worthy of continued support. Others 
spend their time drinking tea and playing cards, hoping that something will 
turn up - perhaps in the form of an opportunity to marry a cousin from 
Britain. Rural stagnation is commonplace enough in the Third World, and 
is often attributed to lack of local financial and entrepreneurial resources. 
But this is not so in Mirpur. The whole 
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area is capital rich, for banks can now be found even in the most remote 
villages, and all have vast sums on deposit. For example, all the five major 
banks were represented in the village in which I conducted intensive 
fieldwork, and altogether they had Rs5 crore (over 1=2 million) on deposit 
- all for a local population of little more than 3,000. But these funds have 
not been used locally. The banks' local loan portfolio is insignificant, 
which means that villagers' savings are actually being used to finance 
investment by others elsewhere. But to suggest that this is a consequence 
of an absence of local entrepreneurial ability is most implausible, given 
Mirpuri migrants' success as small businessmen in Britain. Rather, local 
conditions are such that profitable avenues of investment are unavailable. 
It is these which have produced stagnation, and which account for the 
absence of a demand for loans. 
Following the initial remittance-driven boom, Mirpur's_, economy has 
slipped gradually backwards, and is now heavily dependent on the 
continued inflow of remittances. This unhealthy condition, which is far 
from being the inevitable outcome of overseas emigration (see Ballard 
1983a), is primarily a consequence of the way in which Pakistan's whole 
economy is structured. It is no fault of the Mirpuris themselves that 
agriculture has been rendered increasingly unprofitable as a result of 
central pricing policies, nor that the Government of Pakistan has done next 
to nothing to mobilize local resources, nor even to provide the 
infrastructural facilities around which migrants could more profitably and 
productively invest their savings. The issues here are structural. 
The consequences of migration to the Middle East 
While economic conditions in Mirpur may be a cause for concern, it is 
even more alarming to note that much the same processes arc currently 
occurring throughout the much larger area from which there has been 
heavy migration to the Middle East (Amjad 1984). At first sight the local 
economy in these areas seems in good shape, just as it did in Mirpur in the 
late 1960s. A building boom is in full swing, and the bazaars, and indeed 
the whole of the service sector, is expanding rapidly. Wages have risen 
sharply, and there is an acute shortage of construction workers. But just as 
in Mirpur, little productive investment is taking place, either in agriculture 
or anywhere else. 
This erosion of the local productive base is the most worrying 
development of all. A housing-driven boom is all very well, but it provides 
no foundation for future growth. On the contrary it is 
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evidence of a slide into a condition of dependency, where prosperity can 
only be sustained by a continuing inflow of remittances. But this, it is now 
clear, will not take place. In Mirpur, where their volume has gone into slow 
decline, conditions are bad enough. But in those areas which are dependent 
on the Middle Eastern labour market the problem is much more serious. 
Not only is the volume of remittances set to decline very sharply, but 
migrants themselves are now returning in large numbers, and mostly for 
good. In the short run most can hope to live in some style off their 
accumulated savings; and their spending will also provide a buffer against 
the immediate collapse of the local economy. But as everyone is well 
aware, the money will soon run out. What will happen then? Returnees 
may live in fine new concrete houses, often equipped with televisions, 
videos, and refrigerators. But none of these can be eaten. As their 'smart 
consumer goods gradually fall into disrepair, former migrants may find 
themselves faced with the bleak choice of trying to find work in Pakistan's 
already overcrowded cities, or of returning to subsistence agriculture, using 
nothing but traditional technology. Despite all their hard work, they will 
have reaped few long-term benefits from the window of opportunity 
offered by the temporary availability of well-paid work in the Middle East. 
. Migration and the role of the State 
Most of the obstacles and inequalities which Pakistani migrants have 
encountered, both at home and overseas, were far beyond their own 
control. Like rural migrants everywhere, they have been seeking to 
circumvent those obstacles as best they could, in order to move forward in 
an unequal world. But they have had no control over the structure of their 
economic environment, nor over the looms and slumps in the global labour 
market. That this should be so overseas is hardly surprising, for immigrant 
minorities rarely have much bargaining power. But in this case it is no less 
true within their own homeland. To see why this should be so we must 
examine just who controls Pakistan's economy, how, for what purposes, 
and to whose benefit. 
Although Pakistan is extremely rich in natural resources, it is currently 
facing an acute economic crisis (Ahmed and Amjad 1984). In the absence 
of any kind of birth control program, the population is growing rapidly, 
while agricultural production is at best static, and probably declining 
(Pakistan Economic Survey 1984/5). Rural infrastructural investment on 
roads, canals, 
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electrification, education, health care, and so forth is minimal, and so the 
picture of rural stagnation presented here is more or less typical (subject to 
the necessary local and regional qualifications) of the whole country. But 
the major cities are rather better provided for. Not only are infrastructural 
facilities concentrated there, they also have a superficial air of prosperity. 
Imported consumer goods, such as motor cycles, cars, cassette players, 
televisions, washing machines, refrigerators, air conditioners, and so forth, 
all of which are heavily advertised in the media, are freely available - at a 
price. Beguiled by all this, many young men are drifting to the towns. Only 
rarely do they get regular jobs, which are extremely hard to find. But at 
least they know that the chances of mobility are much greater in an urban 
than in a rural context. 
Apart from the rural-urban divide, Pakistan is also a highly inegalitarian 
society in terms of class. But in this case privilege comes not so much from 
the ownership of industrial capital, nor even of extensive tracts of land 
(though most members of the elite have either one or the other) but rather 
through their control of the machinery of the state. The elite, composed 
mainly of senior bureaucrats and military officers, is small, but its 
members live extremely comfortably, mainly as a result of bending the 
economy to their own interests. It is from this perspective that the 
contemporary Pakistani social order is best understood. 
Ever since Partition in 1947, the country has been ruled by a succession 
of authoritarian regimes, almost all of which have had reason to be 
doubtful about the extent of their popular support (Ziring 1980). And 
although all paid lip-service to the need to respond to the needs of the rural 
majority, those in power were well aware that it was urban revolt which 
had brought down all their predecessors. Hence, for example, there has 
been a great reluctance to raise agricultural prices, even if this led to a 
large net transfer of resources away from the agricultural sector, and so to 
rural stagnation (see Naqvi 1984: 34). Much the same considerations lie 
behind the unequal distribution of infrastructural resources between urban 
and rural areas. Despite much public rhetoric about the promotion of 
economic development, securing the status quo, above all by containing 
the possibility of urban revolt, has long been the central priority of the 
Pakistani state. 
In this situation the emergence of a large inflow of migrant remittances 
came as a godsend. Pakistan has long had a deteriorating balance of trade, 
as imports, composed mostly of consumer goods, and of which the elite re 
disproportionately 
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large consumers, have risen much more sharply than exports (Naqvi 1984: 
89). But over the past twenty years the rapidly rising flow of remittances, 
at first from Britain, and more recently from the Middle East, has been 
available to cover the deficit. This inflow is now absolutely critical to the 
economy. Not only do migrants provide over 50 per cent of the country's 
foreign exchange, they also bring back a large volume of consumer goods 
as personal baggage - and import duties are now the Government of 
Pakistan's largest single source of revenue. No wonder the promotion of 
`manpower export' has become one of the Government's central economic 
priorities. 
Yet the whole structure is becoming increasingly unstable. The demand 
for Pakistani labour overseas is bound to shrink, whatever the authorities 
may predict (Planning Commission 1984), and most migrants are set to 
return, whether they like it or not. And although they may have put 
immense efforts into the personal generation of capital resources overseas, 
it is most unlikely that many will be able to put them to any great use: 
indeed the process of filching slices off their resources begins long before 
they return. Consider the exchange rate, for example. Most commentators 
are agreed that the Pakistani rupee has long been overvalued (see Naqvi 
1984), and my own estimate is that this may be by as much -as 100 per 
cent. The result has been not only to cheapen imports, but also to devalue 
remittances, which are, in effect, subjected to an invisible tax. The easy 
availability of foreign exchange has been of direct advantage to the elite, 
partly because it has facilitated the easy import of the luxury goods of 
which they are disproportionately large consumers, and also because it has 
given them excellent opportunities for capital export. As in so many other 
stagnant corners of the Third World, the most senior members of the 
Pakistani regime now have the greater part of their savings safely tucked 
away in bank accounts in London, New York, and Basel. So when the 
crunch does come, as inevitably it will, they will be able to retire to 
comfort and safety on the nearest Jumbo jet. The deteriorating condition of 
Pakistan's rural economy is of little concern to them: indeed it is the real 
source of their wealth. 
It is only when placed in this very broad context that the full extent of 
the exploitation to which overseas migrants may be subjected, often by 
means of the hidden transfer of resources, begins to emerge. Peasants 
everywhere are rightly suspicious of all external agencies, because they 
have been exploited too many times before. So it is thoroughly 
understandable that they should regard their villages of origin as the safest 
haven of all. Poor they 
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may be, but at least they seem to be fully under their own control. That is why 
they build houses there, buy land, and put their money in their local banks. 
However exploitative foreigners may be, they do at least know where their 
own kinsmen stand. But this vision reckons without the pervasive effects of 
contemporary economic processes, which have made their homelands much 
less of a haven than they had supposed. 
In the past two decades migrants have poured billions of dollars into rural 
Pakistan, but there is little to show for it. Grand new pakka houses have been 
constructed by the thousand, bazaars have expanded dramatically, and 
televisions and videos have arrived in the remotest rural areas. But what has 
not changed is the underlying structure of the national economy. Although in 
all the emigrant areas the capital resources needed to build new roads and 
irrigation systems, and to finance electrification and agricultural extension 
programmes and so forth are most certainly available, no such public 
investment has taken place. In its absence, private investment remains 
unprofitable. So having built their houses, returnees have little alternative but 
to put their money in the bank. But how have these resources actually been 
used? The principal borrowers from the nationalized Pakistani banks have 
been, once again, the urban elite, who are using the loans to enhance their own 
wealth. But will they repay? The saddest fate of all would be for migrants to 
discover that when they wanted their money back, the banks had made so 
many bad loans to a disappearing elite that they were unable to reimburse their 
depositors. 
Yet none of this should be regarded as an inevitable consequence of 
migration. The resources which migrants have generated through their labour 
overseas could have been used more productively, to construct a more secure 
economic base before the next global slump set in. That this has not occurred 
is no fault of the migrants themselves - it was primarily a consequence of the 
structure of inequality within the Pakistani social order itself. In the absence of 
political action to change that order, there was little that migrants could do but 
what they did. 
Conclusion: migration in a global context 
Migration is, at heart, an attempt to circumvent institutionalized inequality, but 
in making this attempt migrants face many obstacles, including the historical 
legacies of Colonialism and Empire, regional and class structures in their 
countries of origin, 
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and a further set of racial and class divisions in their countries of 
settlement. It is economic and industrial expansion, with its attendant 
demand for additional labour, that opens up opportunities for migrants in 
the first place, but consolidating that foothold is far from easy. Once 
recession sets in, no-one is more vulnerable than migrant workers. Their 
most central problem is that of externality, which constantly limits their 
bargaining power. Away from home, even the simplest moves towards 
organization in defence of their interests is likely to precipitate vigorous 
condemnation of their behaviour from those among whom they have 
settled. But as we have just seen, migrants are no less external to their 
countries of origin, and so just as vulnerable to exploitation at home as 
they are abroad. Indeed such is the paucity of industrial production in 
Pakistan, and so large the scale of emigration, it seems plausible to suggest 
that the country now has what can best be described as an `external 
proletariat': as severely exploited at home as they are overseas, they have 
no secure base around which to organize to protect their interests. Migrants 
overseas usually begin by organizing themselves in ethnic terms, for their 
common origins provide an effective and convenient foundation for both 
mutual assistance and collective action. Moreover, the formation of such 
aggregations reflects the facts of competition, both with members of the 
indigenous 'population and with other migrant groups, for the limited 
volume of resources available. In such circumstances, solidarity among all 
migrants working in a particular country is difficult, if not impossible to 
achieve. Instead, as at present in the Middle East, migrants of differing 
national origins are likely to compete fiercely with one another, and 
regularly to undercut each other's wages: since they have little in common, 
external proletarians in any one locality are necessarily hard to unify. And 
of course neither their employers nor the ruling elites who stand behind 
them have any interest in the emergence of such solidarity, for it will 
necessarily be a threat to their interests. As Marx pointed out, they will 
always do their best to undermine it.' 
Failing the development of comprehensive solidarity among all 
migrants, let alone all workers, national solidarity is at least a fallback. But 
how much support does it get? In principle all countries are expected to 
protect the interests of their nationals overseas, but in practice labour 
exporting states such as Pakistan regard this as a luxury they cannot afford. 
Locked into a policy which is dependent on manpower export to keep the 
economy float, those in charge of the state apparatus need to convince 
labour importers that their product is amongst the cheapest and 
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most docile on the market. As Pakistani migrants to the Middle East have 
learned to their cost, their Embassies are rarely willing to take up 
grievances on their behalf, however legitimate they may be. Instead they 
are much more likely to take active steps to repress them. Likewise in 
Britain the Pakistani Embassy does little or nothing to defend its citizens' 
interests. Instead it constantly advises them to adapt themselves to local 
conditions, while simultaneously suggesting that it is the patriotic duty of 
all Pakistanis to maximize their remittances. 
If migrants are exposed abroad, they are little better off at home. They 
are usually regarded as uniquely privileged, and are the object of 
considerable jealousy. And it is not just their dependent kinsmen who arc 
envious of their apparently boundless wealth, so too are the urban elite - 
who are deeply affronted by the thought that mere peasants may now have 
access to televisions, washing machines, and so forth. This has even been 
formalized in the theory of the `Dubai syndrome', which represents newly 
rich migrants' behaviour as misguided and disturbed. In such a climate 
there is no space for a serious discussion of migrants' difficulties, and still 
less for the construction of a positive response to them. 
Seen in this light, Pakistani migrants who are more or less permanently 
settled in Britain are comparatively well placed, despite the numerous 
obstacles they face. So far, at least, their rights of citizenship have 
remained secure, and many of their children are now achieving 
considerable educational success (see, for example, Ballard and Vellins 
1984). This is not to play down the extent and severity of the racial 
exclusionism that the minorities routinely encounter, but simply to 
emphasize that the structures of inequality their compatriots face both in 
the Middle East and in Pakistan are in many respects more severe than 
those in contemporary Britain. But wherever they may be, everyone is 
faced by the changing structure of the global economy. Not only is the 
demand for manual labour shrinking everywhere, but the decline is proving 
to be particularly sharp in both urban industrial Britain and the once 
booming oil states of the Middle East. Through no fault of their own, the 
villagers of Northern Pakistan are not well placed in the contemporary 
labour market. 
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